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I. INTRODUCTION

Few contemporary issues of international security are more prominent
than the dilemma posed by Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.
For its part, Iran insists that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful
purposes.1 Nevertheless, the United Nations, through a number of Security
Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actions, has
found Iran in breach of its responsibilities.2 Israel, along with most of the
world, is convinced that beyond simply violating IAEA directives, Iran is
developing nuclear weapons, and Israel is one of the main, if not the main
target.3
In a September 2012 speech to the United Nations, Israel’s Prime
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, voiced “his fear that Iran would use a
nuclear bomb to eliminate his nation.”4 According to Netanyahu, “[b]y
next spring, at most by next summer at current enrichment rates, [Iran] will
have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the final stage”

*
Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1975;
B.A., St. Joseph’s University, 1972. Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 2006‒2010.
Professor of the Practice of Law and Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security,
Duke University School of Law. This article is based on remarks at the 91st Annual Meeting of the
American Branch of the International Law Association, Fordham Law School, Oct. 27, 2012.
1.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report of the Director, International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55, para 9, (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
2.

Id. §§ A, B, L.

3.
See generally, Iran's Nuclear Program (Nuclear Talks, 2012), N.Y. TIMES, Updated Nov. 16,
2012, at A1, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/
nuclear_program/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (emphasis added).
4.
At UN General Debate, Israeli Leader Calls for ‘Red Line’ for Action on Iran’s Nuclear
Plans, UN NEWS CENTER, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
43088&Cr=general+debate&Cr1= (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).

320

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 19:2

needed to produce a weapon.5 He said that a “red line should be drawn
right here . . . [b]efore Iran gets to a point where it's a few months away or a
few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a
nuclear weapon.”6
The United States (U.S.) has long asserted that it will not tolerate a
nuclear-armed Iran. President Obama reiterated in October of 2012 his
unequivocal declaration that “as long as [he is] president of the United
States Iran will not get a nuclear weapon.”7 Thus, preventing Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon appears to be a nonnegotiable cornerstone of the
President’s policy. In addition, he points out that Iran has said that it wants
to “see Israel wiped off the map” and insistes that “if Israel is attacked,
America will stand with Israel.” 8
These plain-spoken pronouncements suggest that the President is
prepared to use any means, including military force, to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. That said, while America will “stand with
Israel” if it is attacked, it is not clear what precisely the U.S. would do if
Israel had not been attacked, per se, but nevertheless perceived itself at
risk—if, for example, Iran reached the enrichment thresholds that Prime
Minister Netanyahu sees as “red lines.”9 If such red lines are reached, it
would seem that Israel, if not the U.S. as well, would advance the military
option even if an actual weapon had not been assembled and deployed.
Importantly, the President maintains that a nuclear Iran would be not
just a threat to Israel, but also to U.S. national security.10 But it further
appears that, at least for now, he is satisfied with pursuing a “policy of
applying diplomatic pressure and potentially having bilateral discussions
with the Iranians to end their nuclear program.”11 He also seems optimistic
about the effectiveness of sanctions, as he has argued that Iran’s economy is
“in a shambles.”12 He asserts that:

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.
2012 Presidential Debate: President Obama and Mitt Romney’s remarks at Lynn
University on Oct. 22, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2012 (transcript) (Remarks of President Barack Obama),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/2012-presidential-debate-president-obama-andmitt-romneys-remarks-at-lynn-university-on-oct-22-running-transcript/2012/10/22/be8899d6-1c7a11e2-9cd5-b55c38388962_story.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Presidential Debate].
8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Presidential Debate, supra note7.
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[The administration] organized the strongest coalition and the
strongest sanctions against Iran in history, and it is crippling their
economy. Their currency has dropped 80 percent. Their oil
production has plunged to the lowest level since they were
fighting a war with Iraq 20 years ago. So their economy is in a
13
shambles.

While sanctions have certainly harmed the Iranian economy,14
implementing truly draconian restrictions has proven difficult, as many
countries are dependent upon Iranian oil. Accordingly, the U.S. was
recently obliged to renew waivers for Iran’s top oil buyers,15 even as Iran
continued to defy international mandates. If sanctions fail, and the “red
lines” are crossed, the question then arises, what would be the legal basis
for taking military action?
Since the establishment of the United Nations, member countries have
agreed to forgo the use of force, or threat of the use of force, against
another state.16 There are two exceptions to this prohibition: 1) if the
Security Council authorizes military force under Chapter VII of the
Charter;17 or 2) if necessary as an act of self-defense.18
As to the Security Council option, it is very unlikely any resolution
authorizing a use of force against Iran for the development of a nuclear
weapon will be forthcoming. For example, Russian foreign minister Sergei
Lavrov indicated to reporters in late October 2012 that Russia will block

13.

Id.

14.
See, e.g., Farnaz Fassihi and Jay Solomon, In Iran’s Factories and Shops, Tighter
Sanctions
Exact
Toll,
WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Jan.
3,
2013,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578120250597512768.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2013).
15.
Timothy Gardner & Roberta Rampton, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to India,
China, REUTERS, Dec. 7, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/us-usa-iransanctons-idUSBRE8B615M20121207 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
16.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 provides: “Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
17.

See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 42, which provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

18.
See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Smith & John B. Bellinger III, Providing a Legal Basis to Attack Iran,
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0927/opinions/35497254_1_military-force-president-obama-iran (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
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any resolution that “could be interpreted as authorizing military action
against Iran.”19 In addition, many observers believe that China would also
likely exercise a veto against military action.20
As a result. any military action that might be taken against Iran would
have to be justified under a theory of self-defense. Article 51 of the UN
Charter provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
21
maintain or restore international peace and security.

The obvious problem here is that the Charter seems to require not just
the crossing of some “red line” or even the acquisition of a nuclear weapon,
but rather an “armed attack.” While Israel has not been the victim of a
nuclear attack, at least one commentator insists that Israel has, indeed, been
the victim of an “armed attack” attributable to Iran.
Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, argues that Israel
already has the legal right to attack Iran by claiming that Iran directed the
1992 attack on Israel’s embassy in Argentina, as well as alleging that more
recently, Iran was supplying weapons to Hamas.22
According to
Dershowitz, the “law of war does not require an immediate military
response to an armed attack,” and adds, “[t]he nation attacked can postpone
its counterattack without waiving its right.”23
Professor Dershowitz’s argument is not sustainable as a matter of
international law. In the 1986 Nicaragua case, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) found that the provision of arms to nonstate actors did not
amount to an “armed attack” against the victim nation, and also concluded
19.
Russia to Veto any UN Motion on Iran, NOVINITE.COM (Oct. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=144421 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
20.

Smith, supra note 18.

21.

U.N. Charter art. 51.

22.
Alan Dershowitz, Israel Has the Right to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Reactors Now,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 16, 2011) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/israelhas-the-right-to-a_b_836764.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
23.

Id.
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that even certain kinds of armed clashes (“frontier incidents”) did not
qualify either.24
In addition, the ICJ made it clear that necessity and proportionality
were essential elements to the exercise of lawful self-defense.
Notwithstanding Professor Dershowitz’s claims to the contrary, there is
utterly no authority or precedent for the notion that resurrecting a more than
twenty-year-old incident involving an embassy attack would sustain a
finding of the requisite “necessity” to support a self-defense strike on major
nuclear facilities.
Dershowitiz offers another rationale. He argues that Iran has “publicly
declared war on Israel by calling for it ‘to be wiped off the map.’”25
Among the problems with this argument is the simple fact that not even the
most bellicose of officials in both Israel and Iran are contending that a state
of war exists between the nations, notwithstanding the hostility of the
rhetoric. Thus, neither the self-defense nor the state of war theory espoused
by Professor Dershowitz is sufficiently supported by the facts.
Another legal academic, Anthony D’Amato of Northwestern
University, takes a somewhat different tack in arguing the legality of a
military operation against Iran.26 He says that if Iran is constructing nuclear
weapons, it is “enough” for him that “Iran says it wants to push the Israelis
into the sea.”27 Under those circumstances, he contends, “it can hardly be
said” that Israel and the U.S. would be violating international law if they
took the “initiative to block” Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear device.
According to D’Amato:
[Action against Iran] can only be preserving international law for
future generations . . . . In order to preserve international law we
have to defend it once in a while. I think we have to defend it
against rogue states or states that have expressed hostile
intentions, like Iran and like North Korea. The only reasonable

24.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986
ICJ
REP.
14,
94,
(June
27,
2012),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5 (Last visited Feb.
23 2013).
25.
Experts Mull Legality of Strike on Iran, WORLD NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2013) available at
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/04/12/Experts-mull-legality-of-strike-on-Iran/UPI79071334277960/ (Last visited Feb. 23 2013).
26.

Id.

27.

Id.
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thing to do is to take those weapons out. Remove that threat and
28
the world is going to be safer.

Little in Professor D’Amato’s approach aligns with existing
understandings of use of force law in the post-UN Charter era. Instead, he
appears to embrace the concept of “illegal but justified” to legitimize an
attack on Iran. Generally speaking, the “illegal but justified” concept has
been raised in the past, especially in the context of humanitarian
interventions. However, Professor Anthea Roberts of the London School of
Economics points out that even in the often sympathetic setting of a
humanitarian crisis, the concept “is ultimately not a sustainable position in
international law [because] it will come to be recognized as an exception to
the prohibition on the use of force.”29 Such concerns are warranted, as she
explains:
The “illegal but justified” approach also shifts the focus away
from questions of legality and towards questions of legitimacy.
Attempting to completely divorce legality and legitimacy can
ossify the law and undermine its relevance, which increases the
risk of self-serving exceptionalism. Relying on legitimacy as an
independent justification for action is also problematic because
legitimacy is underdefined and open to manipulation by powerful
30
actors.

Consequently, advocates of the use of force against Iran must assess
the appropriateness of such a course of action not based on the “illegal but
justified” theory, but rather within the context of the anticipatory selfdefense doctrine.
II. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
What exactly is meant by anticipatory self-defense? In answering that
vital question, it may be helpful to understand what the term does not mean.
Professor Sean Murphy reminds us that anticipatory self-defense is not the

28.

Id.

29.

Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?, in
HUMAN RIGHT, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 212 (P. Alston, E. Macdonald, eds., Oxford
University Press, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1518290 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2013).
30.

Id.
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same as preemptive self-defense.31 He points out that anticipatory selfdefense “refers to the use of armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent
act of armed coercion by another state (or non-state actor operating from
that other state).”32 Preemptive self-defense, he tells us, is different:
Preemptive self-defense is used to refer to the use of armed
coercion by a state to prevent another state (or non-state actor)
from pursuing a particular course of action which is not yet
directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue, could
result at some future point in an act of armed coercion against the
33
first state.

Action constituting preemptive self-defense so defined requires a
Security Council resolution. The anticipatory self-defense doctrine can,
however, justify unilateral action. Authority for anticipatory self-defense is
not literally set forth in the text of the U.N. Charter. Indeed, because of the
absence of an explicit textual endorsement of anticipatory self-defense,
many experts do not accept its legitimacy.34
However, as noted above, Article 51 does provide in relevant part that
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence . . . .”35 Among those that do believe
in the legality of anticipatory self-defense, they usually argue it is derived
from Article 51’s reference to the “inherent” right of self-defense.
Where is this “inherent” right sourced? Most scholars point to the
1837 Caroline incident as the most important event admitting the
doctrine.36 The Caroline was a boat used to transport supplies to Canadian
rebels. Despite her being moored in U.S. territory, British forces entered
the U.S., boarded the vessel, killed an American crewman, set the ship on
fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls. In the ensuing diplomatic uproar, the
British claimed their action was justified in self-defense. Daniel Webster,
then Secretary of State, addressed this claim in a response to the British
Ambassador.
31.
Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 703‒04 (2005),
http://lsgs.georgetown.edu/programs/nlp/preventivewar/Villanova%20Preemption%20Article%20Final.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2013) (emphasis added).
32.

Id. at 703.

33.

Id. at 704.

34.

See, e.g., SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, ANTHONY JOHN BILLINGSLEY, & CHRISTOPHER
MICHAELSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 136 (2010) (referencing the “doubtful
status of the legality of anticipatory self-defense”).
35.

U.N. Charter, at art. 51 (emphasis added)

36.

KINGA TIBORI-SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE 72‒75 (2011).
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Webster conceded that a “just right of self-defense attaches always to
nations as well as to individuals, and is equally necessary for the
preservation of both.” When “clear and absolute necessity” warrants it a
state, Webster contends, can use force in self-defense. Moreover, Webster's
further articulation that the necessity for self-defense must be “instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation” has come to define the prerequisites for anticipatory selfdefense.37
Although some authorities nevertheless continue to claim that “the
dominant view amongst states and international lawyers is that anticipatory
self-defense is not permissible under international law,”38 it is difficult to
find any state that unequivocally and publicly asserts that it knowingly will
forego the opportunity to use force to avert the blow of an armed attack it
knows it will imminently and inevitably receive. It may be such blunt
reality that prompted the Secretary General of the United Nations to declare
in a 2005 report:
Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which
safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend
themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized
that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already
39
happened.

For its part, the U.S. State Department cited this statement and said
“the United States welcomed the report’s . . . recognition of a right of
anticipatory self-defense in appropriate circumstances.”40 As a result,
whatever theories or objections academics and others may have, it appears
now that most states (albeit not without dispute) accept the legitimacy of
anticipatory self-defense.

37.

Id. at 75 (sourcing Daniel Webster quotes).

38.
See, e.g., James Mulcahy and Charles O. Mahony, Anticipatory Self-Defense: A
Discussion of the International Law, 2 HANSE L. REV. 231, 233 (2006), available at
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf4/Vol2No2Art06.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
39.
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights For All, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
40.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE
YEAR 2006, PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, Part 5, at 138 (2006).
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III. THE QUESTION OF IMMINENCE
The difficulty in applying anticipatory self-defense is determining
exactly what “imminent” means, and whether reasonably reliable facts exist
in a particular situation to support an imminence finding. The U.S. has long
taken a somewhat aggressive interpretation as to this prerequisite of a fully
justified act of anticipatory self-defense. In the 2005 version of the U.S.’s
official Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE),41 for example, U.S. forces
are permitted to take action in self-defense not only when victimized by a
hostile act, but also when faced with “hostile intent.”42 Hostile intent is
defined as:
The threat of imminent use of force against the United States,
U.S. forces or other designated persons or property. It also
includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission
and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S.
43
personnel or vital USG property.

In turn, “imminent use of force” is defined rather expansively.
Specifically, the SROE states:
g. Imminent Use of Force. The determination of whether the use
of force against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an
assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at
the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not
44
necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.

41.
U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK ch. 5, app. A (2012) [hereinafter
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK] (republished from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement(SORE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (2005)).
42.

Id. at ¶ 6b(1). The SROE states:
Self-Defense. Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to
exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military
members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or
demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a
unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As
such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their
unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other U.S. Military
forces in the vicinity.

43.

Id. at ¶ 3f.

44.

Id. at ¶ 3g.
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Nevertheless, although arguably the U.S. is already more flexible on
the temporal requirement of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine than
other nations, it is possible that it is evolving towards an even more
expansive reading. In a 2011 speech, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, discussed the
greater flexibility with respect to the imminence requirement in the context
of terrorist threats:
We are finding increasing recognition in the international
community that a more flexible understanding of “imminence”
may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups . . . . Over
time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism
partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception
of what constitutes an “imminent” attack should be broadened in
light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and
45
technological innovations of terrorist organizations.

Mr. Brennan’s reference to “modern-day capabilities, techniques, and
technological innovations” is significant in the context of the terrible
potential of nuclear weapons. It is certainly true that these weapons have
enjoyed something of a special status in international law. William
Boothby points out in his treatise Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict
that their use is not governed by the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions46
that otherwise comprehensively regulate the means and methods of war.47
Indeed, Boothby notes that other than the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, no treaty “either prohibits or restricts the development,
stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of such weapons, or threats to use
them.”48
In its 1996 case about nuclear weapons, the ICJ also seemed to accord
them special status. In a lengthy opinion the ICJ generally lambasts the
weapons, and concludes that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed
45.
John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism,
Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security by
Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sep. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2013).
46.
PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949, AND
RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), art.
57, ¶ 2(b), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). Although the U.S. is not a
party to Protocol I, parts of it are considered customary international law.
47.

WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 215‒20 (2009).

48.

Id. at 220.
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conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”49
Yet, the ICJ concedes that the “Court cannot conclude definitively whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state
would be at stake.”50
All of this seems to suggest that the world community recognizes that
these weapons are distinctive, and that special considerations apply to them.
This might suggest that given their unique potential to put the “very
survival of the state” at risk, more flexibility as to the meaning of
“imminence” might be applicable where they constitute an existential threat
to the target state. As the experience of the U.S. and the Soviet Union
militaries during the Cold War amply demonstrates, these weapons can be
mated to delivery platforms such as missile systems that are capable of
being launched on very short notice. Once launched, it can be extremely
difficult or impossible to defend against them.51
At the same time it must be recalled that there is “no rule in general
international law which prohibits a State from developing and/or possessing
nuclear weapons, per se.”52 Moreover, as a matter of international law, it
appears that a nuclear weapons program at its very nascent stage does not
qualify as an “imminent” threat, even when it may be plain that the
developing state may very well intend to use the weapons against another
state.53 This is one reason why Israel’s 1981 attack against Iraq’s Osirak
reactor as it was nearing operational status earned universal
condemnation—to include that of the United States—in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 48754 despite assertions of self-defense by Israel.55

49.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 226
(July 8, 1996).
50.

Id; see also BOOTHBY, supra note 477, at 221.

51.
However, the U.S. and Israel conduct an annual exercise aimed at countering the threat of
ballistic missiles. See Jim Garamone, U.S. Partners with Israel for Exercise Austere Challenge, AMERICAN
FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118239 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2013).
52.

TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51OF THE UN CHARTER 359 (2010).

53.
Some take a different perspective. One author points out that in a 1981 Congressional
hearing concerning the Osirak raid Professor John Norton Moore “noted that the effort to strike the
reactor before it went critical must also be taken into consideration and, even if were two to five years
before the Iraqis could product a bomb: ‘Then I think that the action might well be legal.’” Lt. Col. Uri
Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self-Defense, 109
MIL. L. REV. 191, 222 (1985) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
54.

S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 36 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg, UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981).

55.

See Shoham, supra note 53.
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In any event, the best publicly available estimates seem to suggest that
Iran would have enough enriched uranium to produce enough “fissile
material for 2 nuclear weapons by late 2013 or early 2014.”56 Of course,
merely possessing a nuclear weapon is only part of the process, as there
must be a delivery platform. In that regard, Iran’s ballistic missile program
may be able to produce a medium-range missile capable of striking Israel,
although an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the U.S.
seems to be some years distant.57
Importantly, however, the mere possession of nuclear weapons and the
means of delivering them is not, in any event, alone sufficient to justify an
act of anticipatory self-defense, even taking into account the gravity of the
nuclear threat. While the facts need not necessarily show that an attack is
actually under way as some have argued,58 and the threat need not be
“immediate or instantaneous,” the evidence still must show something more
than capability and deep animosity before an attack based on anticipatory
self-defense could be legally justified. One need only reference the Cold
War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to appreciate that such conduct
can exist for literally decades without an attack occurring.
Discerning the Iranian calculus about the actual use of a nuclear
device, especially in the face of official denials of any intent to acquire the
weapons, is difficult. Still, there is no reason to assume Iran will fail to take
into account Israel’s military capabilities in the decision-making process.
This is especially so when experts estimate that with “80 or 90” nuclear
weapons—along with the missiles, planes, and submarines to deliver
them—Israel has an overwhelming advantage in terms of its nuclear
capability.59 Quite obviously, for the foreseeable future Israel would be
able to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow in the event the Iranians chose to
use the one or two weapons it is believed they might be able to acquire by
2014. Even rogue regimes that possess nuclear weapons recognize the risk
to their existence posed by powers with a vastly superior arsenal, and
exercise restraint accordingly.60 In short, the required element of
56.
Maseh Zarif, The Iranian Nuclear Program: Timelines, Data, and Estimates V5.0, AEI
IranTracker, Nov. 23, 2012, available at http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear-program/zarif-timelinesdatea-estimates-november-23-2012.
57.
See generally, STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SEV., R42849, IRAN’S BALLISTIC
MISSILE AND SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAMS (2012).
58.
See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 190‒92 (4th ed.
2005) (discussing “interceptive self-defense”).
59.
Eric Niiler, What’s Up With Israel’s Nukes Nuclear Program, DISCOVERY NEWS, Oct 4,
2012, http://news.discovery.com/tech/israel-iran-nuclear-weapons-121004.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2013).
60.
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imminence to support the necessity for an anticipatory self-defense attack
does not appear to currently exist.
IV. ANTICIPATORY COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
Even if one is among those who accept the legitimacy of anticipatory
self-defense, and also further believes that sufficient facts exist to support
an imminent threat to Israel, there is nevertheless the additional question as
to whether anticipatory collective self-defense is extant in international law.
In other words, to what extent can America “stand with Israel” where the
threat of Iranian attack does not directly imperil the U.S.? Again, the text
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides no specific authority. Rather, it
confines collective self-defense to circumstances where an armed attack has
already occurred. Accordingly, if anticipatory collective self-defense exists
at all, it must—like anticipatory self-defense itself—be contained within the
“inherent” concept of self-defense.
Professor George Walker argues forcefully that it does.61 In his
seminal 1998 article, Walker asserts that the “concept of anticipatory
collective self-defense has existed for nearly two centuries, including the
fifty years during which the Charter has been in force, and this form of joint
response by states appears to have attained the status of a customary
norm.”62 Indeed, Walker contends that the self-defense right the U.N.
Charter negotiators intended as “inherent” in Article 51 “included a right to
anticipatory collective self-defense.”63
Most scholars who accept the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense
seem to agree. For example, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law
of Cyber Warfare,64 a document produced by an international group of
experts, explicitly provides for both anticipatory self-defense65 and
collective self-defense.66 Regarding collective anticipatory self-defense, the
commentary to Rule 16 provides: “Both the victim-State and the State
providing assistance must be satisfied that there is an imminent (Rule 15) or
on-going armed attack.”67 In short, a non-victim state may provide
61.
See generally George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (1998).
62.

Id. at 324–25.

63.

Id. at 351–52.

NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, THE TALLINN MANUAL
LAW OF CYBER WARFARE, (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2012), available at
http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
64.
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65.

Id. at Rule 15.

66.

Id. at Rule 16.

67.

Id. (emphasis added).

332

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 19:2

assistance to a victim as long as an attack is imminent—a clear
endorsement, it seems, of collective anticipatory self-defense.
More broadly, Dr. Kinga Tibori-Szabo, author of the recent treatise
Anticipatory Action in Self-Defense, opines:
[T]here is no (modern-time) instance of state practice for
collective anticipatory self-defense, so we cannot talk about an
explicit "customary right" to collective anticipatory self-defense.
That does not mean, however, that there could not be a lawful
exercise of such a right. Customary law acknowledges collective
self-defense as well as anticipatory self-defense . . . . The
collective nature of the anticipatory action should not bear on its
legality.68

Additionally, Mr. Hays Parks, one of the world’s leading law of armed
conflict experts, likewise concludes that a right of collective anticipatory
self-defense exists in international law, and points to the U.S. Standing
Rules of Engagement as an expression of that view.69 Those rules provide:
Collective Self-Defense.
Defense of designated non-U.S.
military forces and/or designated foreign nationals and their
property from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Only
the President or SecDef may authorize collective self-defense.70

68.
E-mail from Dr. Kinga Tibori-Szabo to Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Professor of Law Duke
University School of Law (Sept. 26, 2012, 3:36 PM EST) (on file with author). Dr. Tibori-Szabo’s full
commentary is as follows:
[T]there is no (modern-time) instance of state practice for collective anticipatory
self-defense, so we cannot talk about an explicit "customary right" to collective
anticipatory self-defense. That does not mean, however, that there could not be a
lawful exercise of such a right. Customary law acknowledges collective selfdefense as well as anticipatory self-defense.
According to the majority opinion, collective self-defense, as such, only requires
an armed attack against one state. If other states wish to aid the attacked state in
exercising self-defense, they can do so, as long as the attacked state agrees.
The same reasoning should apply in case of anticipatory self-defense. If a state
considers, on the basis of the available information (interpreted in good faith) that
it is the object of an imminent attack, it could use its window of opportunity to
request help from its allies.
The legality of such an endeavour would thus depend on meeting the
requirements of anticipatory self-defense by the state that feels in danger. The
collective nature of the anticipatory action should not bear on its legality.
69.

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at ch. 5 app. A.

70.
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Thus, from the American perspective, U.S. forces can act in collective
anticipatory self-defense if the designated foreign entity faces demonstrated
hostile intent, and the President or the Secretary of Defense authorizes it.
Still, some scholars disagree, and not just those who believe that
anticipatory self-defense does not exist at all in the post-Charter era.
Professor Scott Silliman of Duke Law School, maintains that while an
inherent right to anticipatory self-defense can be fairly read into Article 51,
collective anticipatory self-defense cannot.71 Because the Caroline case,
the formative event of the concept of anticipatory self-defense, did not have
a collective element, it cannot be said, he maintains, that there is any
inherent right to collective anticipatory self-defense.72
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As this brief examination illustrates, there do not yet appear to be
adequate facts to support the legality of a strike on Iran, either from
constructs that allege that an armed attack against Israel has already
occurred, or from the perspective of anticipatory self-defense. An even
more puzzling question is what legal authority President Obama would rely
upon to authorize a strike against Iranian facilities in the event Iran acquired
a nuclear weapon (or was about to do so), yet did not act in a manner that
demonstrated intent to actually launch an attack. Again, the mere
possession of a weapon is not, ipso facto, violative of international law in a
way that would authorize the use of force.
Additionally, though beyond the scope of this essay, it is relevant to
note that many—if not most—authorities question whether a use of force
that complies with the dictates of anticipatory self-defense law—that is, it is
proportionate and discriminate—would have anything more than a “limited
chance of operational success.”73 Yet it is also true that airstrikes, for
example, do appear to have something of a record of success. In his book
about the Iraq War, Thomas Ricks reports that experts believe that the
U.S.’s 1998 airstrikes against Iraq’s weapon’s development facilities
effectively ended their ambition to acquire nuclear arms.74
Regardless, if force is eventually used, it will be vitally important for
the U.S. and Israel to have not only firm legal grounds conceptually, but
also a clear, publicly disclosable set of supporting facts. Given the
terrifying potential of nuclear weapons, Israel’s tragic history of the
71.
E-mail from Professor Scott Silliman to Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Professor of Law Duke
University School of Law (Sept. 24, 2012, 6:41 PM EST) (on file with author).
72.

Id.

73.

Ruys, supra note 52, at 363.

74.
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Holocaust, as well as Iran’s inflammatory—and profoundly unwise—
pronouncements challenging Israel’s right to exist, the world may be ready
to accept an aggressive interpretation of what constitutes an imminent threat
of an actual attack, but the absence of any such evidence would likely be
found unacceptable.
In a world in which the spread of technology permits a growing
number of nations to wreak terrible destruction on an opponent, it is more
important than ever to insist upon observance of the law, especially when
doing so is the best hope of preventing the unnecessary use of force and all
the unintended consequences it can entail.75 It is not in either Israel’s or the
United States’ interest to take any actions that would undermine the rule of
law. To date, the legal case justifying a strike has yet to be made.

75.
See, e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran Should Be Key Topic at Hearings, WASH. POST, Jan.
3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-iran-should-be-key-topic-atsenate-hearings/2013/01/03/5dbc3324-5519-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html. Brzezinski writes
that “five potential implications for the United States of an additional and self-generated war deserve
close scrutiny”:
How effective are U.S. military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities likely to
be, with consequences of what endurance and at what human cost to the Iranian
people?
What might be Iran’s retaliatory responses against U.S. interests, and with what
consequences for regional stability? How damaging could resulting instability be
to European and Asian economies?
Could a U.S. attack be justified as in keeping with international standards, and
would the U.N. Security Council—particularly China and Russia, given their veto
power—be likely to endorse it ?
Since Israel is considered to have more than 100 nuclear weapons, how credible is
the argument that Iran might attack Israel without first itself acquiring a
significant nuclear arsenal, including a survivable second-strike capability, a
prospect that is at least some years away?
Could some alternative U.S. strategic commitment provide a more enduring and
less reckless arrangement for neutralizing the potential Iranian nuclear threat than
a unilateral initiation of war in a combustible regional setting?

